The problem of human rights is in many ways a problem of restrictions on human rights. It is easy enough to agree on a list of rights recognized by all; it is much more difficult to determine the boundaries of the interference of the authorities in human rights that is permissible for society. There are human rights that should not be restricted under any circumstances. There are a few of them: – freedom from torture, – freedom from slavery, – freedom of thought, – the right to a fair trial, and a number of procedural rights. For most of the rights and freedoms, restrictions are allowed. However, the authorities should not limit human rights at their own discretion. Power can restrict human rights only in the following cases. First, if the interference of the authorities in human rights is in accordance with the norms of the law. This means that any restriction on human rights must be clearly spelled out in the law. If there is no precise indication of the possibility of a specific restriction in the law, then its introduction will be a violation of human rights, regardless of the person or body that ordered the restriction, its public benefit, etc. Thus, outside the law, any restriction is illegal. Second, the authorities can restrict human rights only to protect these public interests and only if they protect a clearly defined public interest. The generally accepted public interests, for the observance of which restrictions on human rights are permissible, can be national security, the economic well-being of the country, public order, life and health of people, public health, and morality. It is important to understand that the totality of public interests justifying government intervention is different for each of the human rights. For example, we may agree that for the sake of the country’s economic well-being, society may allow the state to violate the privacy of correspondence in certain cases. But we can hardly allow the authorities to violate freedom of religion, guided by the same interests: it is impossible to rationally explain how the implementation of freedom of religion can harm the economic well-being of the country. Third, the restrictions imposed by the authorities on human rights must be permissible in a democratic society. We can imagine that the interference of the authorities in rights and freedoms is allowed by law, that it helps to protect the public interest, but at the same time the imposed restriction is disproportionate, it leads to an actual derogation of the restricted right. For example, one can imagine that the law on rallies and demonstrations allows the introduction of certain restrictions on their holding, which is rationally justified by the interests of state security, the protection of public order, the protection of life, health, morality, the rights and interests of others. One can imagine that among the restrictions imposed by lawmakers will include a ban on rallies near buildings occupied by public authorities. In this case, there will be both the law and the rationale for the restriction by the protection of public interests. However, the freedom of rallies will be reduced to naught: citizens will be able to express their dissatisfaction with the authority far from the place of stay of those who made a decision that did not suit them. For a dictatorship, such a ban is logical; for a democratic society, it is unacceptable. Determining the limits of government interference in human rights that is permissible for a democratic society is one of the most difficult human rights problems. Dr. Sattam Hakem Alfaez, “Shield” International Representative in the Middle East and North Africa.